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Introduction 
 
 
Political parties have taken a pounding in recent years.  In democracies across the world, 
organisations that endured for much of the twentieth century find themselves deserted by 
voters and members alike.  For many a party leadership, this is a time of public rejection.1  
But what of the underlying idea they are born of?  To what extent are the trials of parties 
indicative of the declining resonance of partisanship itself, of the more general political 
outlook in which it makes sense to associate with a party?  Exactly how deep does the rot go? 
Here the trends of the age are ambiguous.  On the one hand there is evidence to suggest 
the difficulties facing parties are rooted in more profound processes of depoliticisation that 
make commitment to collective action less appealing.  Coupled with an analysis of the socio-
economic and institutional constraints on what parties in government can achieve, one may 
easily arrive at a diagnosis of long-term disenchantment with the party as a political form.2  
On this view, parties are a remnant of a different epoch, the residue of the past in the present. 
At the same time one sees signs of renewed partisan engagement, often inspired by 
frustration with alternative modes of political agency.  Whether in Latin America in the 2000s 
or Mediterranean Europe in the 2010s, new parties have developed out of social movements 
and movement coalitions to achieve significant electoral success.  The accounts of activists 
themselves suggest there are features of the party form, notably its continuity and 
comprehensiveness of vision, which are prized at least as much as the alternative qualities of 
spontaneous action.3  The implication is that where alternatives to the party have been tried 
they have been found wanting, prompting their protagonists to return to the partisan model.  
Nor is this interest restricted to new parties: the massive expansion of the British Labour Party 
in summer 2015 during and following the leadership campaign of Jeremy Corbyn shows how 
even long-established parties, at least in some circumstances, retain the capacity to inspire 
mass publics.  
However divergent these readings of the present, both suggest the need to dissect the 
partisan experience more closely.  For those inclined to see the breakthrough of new parties 
as anomalous, there is reason to reflect on the nature of partisanship so as to grasp the stakes 
of its decline.  If this mode of political agency is in trouble, what risks being lost, and what 
can be pursued by other means?  What exactly are the roles and responsibilities that 
contemporary partisans seem prone to default on?  Such questions suggest the need for a 
critical standard against which to assess the significance of party malaise.  Conversely, for 
those who would rather emphasise the model’s enduring potential, the relevant questions will 
centre on how a defence of partisanship might look.  What, if anything, is desirable, about the 
practice, and what normative standards should underpin it?   
In these ambiguous circumstances for the future of partisanship, a number of 
observers have drawn attention to its place in a well-functioning polity.  The most 																																																								
1 Mair, Peter (2013), Ruling The Void: The Hollowing Of Western Democracy (London: Verso). 
2 Streeck, Wolfgang (2014), ‘The Politics of Exit’, New Left Review 88, July-August. 
3 Cf. Della Porta, Donatella and Daniela Chironi (2015), ‘Movements in Parties: OccupyPD’, Partecipazione e 
Conflitto (PACO) 8 (1), p.89; Katz, Claudio (2013), ‘Socialist Strategies in Latin America’, in Jeffery Webber 
and Barry Carr (eds.) The New Latin American Left (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp.45-6.  Social-
movement scholars themselves show increasing interest in parties and a wish to reconnect the two research 
fields: see e.g. Della Porta, Donatella (2009), I Partiti Politici (Bologna: Il Mulino); McAdam, Doug and 
Sidney Tarrow (2010), ‘Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship between Elections and Social 
Movements’, Perspectives on Politics 8 (2); cf. Mudge, Stephanie L. and Anthony S. Chen (2014), ‘Political 
Parties and the Sociological Imagination: Past, Present, and Future Directions’, Annual Review of Sociology 
40, pp.315ff. 
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intellectually ambitious and accomplished of these efforts have come from the United States, 
where dissatisfaction with the major parties has an extensive past.  Amid contemporary 
concerns about unmeasured and unprincipled partisanship in the House and the Senate, Nancy 
Rosenblum and Russell Muirhead in particular have tried to show why parties were ever 
thought desirable in the first place.  Examining the normative foundations of a party system, 
they have offered powerful accounts of why democracy might need its partisans.  These are 
generally neglected issues in the political science of parties, largely focused as it is on the 
structural determinants of partisan behaviour.  They are matters equally neglected in political 
philosophy, where normative reasoning has become increasingly detached from analysis of 
the institutions that might deliver on moral concerns.4 
The book that follows is of a piece with these efforts to rejuvenate the theoretical study 
of partisanship.  But the arguments it develops are different in focus and substance.  Whereas 
Rosenblum and Muirhead write primarily with the US experience in mind, our account is 
influenced by partisan politics in the wider global setting.  In Europe, for instance, the 
historical shift from mass parties to parties of looser association has been more dramatic, as 
has been the remaking of the political ideologies by which they define themselves.  It is a 
context of far-reaching partisan change, even if core features of the practice persist.  Further, 
it is a context of far-reaching change in the institutional setting, as is equally true in Latin 
America.  Whether in view of the changes associated with regional integration or the 
revolutionary overthrow of regimes, partisanship unfolds in an ever-shifting political 
framework.  This is a world of apparently few constitutional essentials, in which 
comprehensive change continues to occur. 
Our account takes a distinctive theoretical turn too.  Emphasising ideals of public 
justification as a constitutive element of partisanship, our account is in some ways more 
demanding.  Partisans, we suggest, are defined not just by a commitment to regulated 
adversarialism – to a struggle that is tempered by rules – but by a commitment to persuade 
others of their views through the appeal to reasons that can be generally shared.  Ours is an 
account of partisanship as a highly principled mode of activity – one that has real-world 
expression in the ideals and practices of existing agents, but often alloyed with actions less 
principled.  At the same time, in some ways our account is less demanding than the 
alternatives, for we wish to make few assumptions about the broadly well-functioning 
character of existing political institutions.  Some of the important virtues of partisanship, in 
our account, can be conceived independently of the institutions that might nurture and 
regulate it – a significant point given existing arrangements may be deeply flawed.  Included 
in our concept of partisanship is the possibility of transformational political ends. 
Furthermore, we wish to go beyond existing accounts by considering, in addition to 
the contribution of partisanship to a democratic system, the viewpoint of partisans 
themselves.  Independent of what party politics can offer the citizenry as a whole, what is the 
value of partisanship to those who might embrace it?  And what distinctive ethical ties might 
the practice of partisanship entail?  What is the significance of the activity as seen from 
within?  Addressing these questions requires an expanded perspective, one that extends not 
just from the study of party systems to the study of the party – a move proposed by Panebianco 
already in the 1980s in a study of party organisation – but one that takes us beyond the study 
of partisan behaviour to the study of the normative outlook that gives meaning to it. 
Rational reconstruction is the term sometimes used to describe an exercise of this 
kind.5  Its point of departure is an existing social practice – one that may display variations, 																																																								
4 Cf. Waldron, Jeremy (2013), ‘Political Political Theory: An Inaugural Lecture’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy 21 (1), pp.1-23. 
5 In the relevant sense, it is developed by Habermas to analyse the legitimacy of the legal order of the modern 
state (see Habermas, Jürgen (1996), Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
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inconsistencies and degenerate forms, but also a basic coherence from a conceptual point of 
view.  On the basis of theoretical reflection disciplined by empirical observation, one builds 
an analysis of the normative presuppositions structuring the activities of those who take part 
in, preserve, extend, reproduce or contest the practice.  This is our intention for the practice 
of partisanship, augmented with an attention to why the practice at its best is one worth 
defending.  In common with interpretative approaches more generally, the aim is to balance 
an understanding of empirical specifics – how actors engage in the practice, criticise it, make 
claims for it and make sense of it – with sensitivity to the counterfactual elements on which 
the meaning of the practice seems predicated or which could plausibly enhance its meaning.  
Identifying in this way the norms that inspire it, one develops an account of where the value 
of that practice should be expected to lie, as well as a critical yardstick with which to assess 
its possible reform. 
Conceived in these terms, the book develops an account of the defining features of 
partisanship as a civic ideal.  It lays out the distinctive ideas, orientations, obligations and 
actions that combine in this political form, and connects them to some of the core concerns 
of contemporary democratic theory and practice.  The account should speak both to the 
detached observer, for whom partisanship is something that others do, and to the activist 
herself, who one hopes will see something of her own outlook in the analysis proposed. 
The book can be thought of in three parts.  The relation between the partisan and the 
political community at large is the subject of the first, explored across a series of chapters that 
analyse the challenging but potentially crucial contribution of partisanship, properly 
conceived, to political life.  The relation between the partisan and their party is the topic of 
the book’s middle section, investigated in terms of the value of political commitment and the 
ethical ties that underwrite it.  The third of our themes concerns the complex relation between 
partisans and political institutions, as revealed in both ordinary and extraordinary 
circumstances. In more detail, the book’s structure is as follows. 
Chapter 1 presents the essentials of our concept of partisanship.  We seek to grasp it 
not only as a set of empirical practices but as a normative idea that describes them in their 
most defensible form.  The chapter examines the tendency in political science towards an 
encompassing definition of party that includes all political groups that contest elections, and 
notes how this departs from an older perspective in which what distinguished this political 
form was a commitment to certain kinds of end.  To retrieve the normative core of the concept 
requires, we suggest, renewed emphasis on what can be called the distinctive partisan claim 
– to be advancing principles and aims that are generalisable, i.e. irreducible to the beliefs or 
interests of particular social groups.   Partisans advance a claim of this kind and take 
coordinated action in support of it, all the while acknowledging the contestable character of 
their claim.  The chapter further examines how taking this claim seriously invites us to look 
beyond the party as membership group to a wider field of partisan activity. 
Chapter 2 looks at how the partisan claim has persistently met with scepticism in the 
history of political thought.  Whereas the defence of parties has tended to be premised on a 
contrast with factions, those unwelcome doubles that corrupt rather than serve the public 
good, such a distinction has long been resisted.  For centuries, party and faction were 
assimilated: political divisions of all kinds were despised for undermining the unity of the 
political community. The chapter examines what is at stake in the distinction between party 																																																								
and Democracy (Cambridge MA: MIT), p.82; see also Gaus, Daniel (2013) ‘Rational Reconstruction as a 
Method of Political Theory between Social Critique and Empirical Political Science’, Constellations 20 (4), 
pp.553–70; Patberg, Markus (2014), ‘Supranational Constitutional Politics and the Method of Rational 
Reconstruction’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (6), pp.501–21).  Our usage is significantly different 
however: we apply the concept to a non-state practice (partisanship) and remain open to transformations in the 
political-institutional context.   
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and faction, revisiting some salient critiques of the partisan idea and acknowledging the force 
of the concerns that inform them.  While the distinction between factions and parties is 
crucial, we suggest, it is for the purpose of critical evaluation rather than taxonomy.  The 
same political grouping may display features of both, depending on its political choices and 
its institutional context.  
Where the relation between partisan and political community is well configured, this 
mode of civic involvement promises a major contribution to the democratic principle of 
collective self-rule.  In Chapter 3 we examine this promise more closely by considering how 
partisanship is constrained by and contributes to standards of political justification.  We 
endorse the norms of reason-giving central to deliberative accounts of democracy, often 
presented as antithetical to partisanship, and seek to show how partisanship is less remote 
from such accounts than it first appears – indeed, how it supplies what is otherwise missing 
in them. Three dimensions of justification are examined in detail: the constituency to which 
it is offered, the circumstances in which it is developed, and the ways in which it is made 
persuasive. In each case, the role of partisanship is probed and affirmed. Partisanship, we 
conclude, is indispensable to the kind of political justification needed to make the exercise of 
collective authority responsive to normative concerns. 
As we move to the middle phase of the book, we look beyond the virtues of 
partisanship for the political community at large to examine why partisans themselves have 
reason to come together and what kinds of tie their association implies.  To be a partisan is, 
after all, first and foremost to stand in a certain relation to others who share similar views.  
Chapter 4 introduces the key notion of commitment in this regard.  It argues that the ideal of 
collective self-rule requires political commitment, and that such commitment is sustained and 
enhanced when politically committed agents form a lasting associative relation – when they 
form a party, in other words.  If the price of their association is a measure of intransigence, 
the sacrifice of some independence of thought and action, it is a price often worth paying in 
view of the merits of political commitment. 
By entering into relations of association in this way, partisans acquire a distinct set of 
mutual obligations – this is the argument of Chapter 5.  The point needs careful elaboration, 
since it is exactly in such notions of in-group loyalty that critics of partisanship see an 
unwelcome constraint on the independence of individuals.  If it is true that partisans are bound 
by special obligations to their associates, on what moral basis are these grounded?  The 
chapter begins with an analysis of why partisanship without obligations is implausible, 
examining the deficiencies of a highly fluid conception of association based on ideas of 
contingent order amongst the like-minded and a process of perpetual reconstitution, in the 
tradition of anarchist thought.  Drawing on analyses of obligation in other contexts, it goes 
on to argue for a compound perspective based on the moral principles of contract, reliance 
and reciprocity.  It is shown how different kinds of partisan may be affected by these 
principles differently – depending, for example, on whether they hold formal party 
membership or whether theirs is a non-membership-based affiliation.    
Chapter 6 shows how the associative obligations of partisans extend in time, based on 
the cross-generational character of the project to which they commit themselves.  The 
meaningfulness of the party idea depends on partisan efforts to coordinate in time.  It follows 
that, to borrow terminology from discussions of intergenerational justice, partisans may be 
said to have ‘ascending’ obligations to their predecessors and ‘descending’ obligations to 
successors.  Though these obligations need not always be decisive, they are of some 
significance in an age when many partisans are engaged in an effort to redefine their 
normative commitments to suit changed historical conditions, sparking concerns amongst 
their fellows that in the process they risk sacrificing their party’s soul. 
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Partisanship is defined by political commitment and the special obligations that attend 
it, yet to be a partisan is also to know when to compromise, especially when the prospect of 
governing is at hand.  Chapter 7 examines this challenge.  Is it possible to reconcile the 
principled commitments of partisanship with a larger set of institutional constraints?  What 
burdens of compromise does the task of government introduce, and how are they best 
negotiated?  The chapter explores the nature of partisan compromise, the relationship between 
compromise and integrity, and the challenge of compromising with one's political 
adversaries. It further asks whether partisan compromise should be understood as principled 
or pragmatic, and offers an account of partisan virtue that steers a middle ground between a 
sectarian approach that deems all compromise unacceptable and an opportunistic one that 
empties the party of its foundational commitments. 
The complex relation of partisans to political institutions is never more visible than in 
transformative circumstances where the institutional architecture itself is in question.  Our 
next two chapters examine partisanship in politically unsettled contexts, looking first in 
Chapter 8 at partisanship in revolutionary times. The chapter examines two theories of 
revolutionary action typically placed in contrast: one emphasising the centrality of 
spontaneous action and mass participation (the spontaneist account), and another defending 
the central role of vanguard parties in preparing the people for revolution (the centralist 
account). We highlight the virtues and limitations of each at two distinct phases: firstly, at the 
point of sparking revolutionary action to fight the injustice of an oppressive regime, and, 
secondly, once revolutionaries have been successful and face the challenge of founding a new 
legal and political order that is legitimate in the eyes of the whole people. The chapter defends 
a hybrid account that acknowledges the tensions between these two stages and that allows 
better appreciation of the value of partisanship in revolutionary circumstances.     
The transnational sphere is another paradigmatic context in which partisanship 
contends with unsettled institutions.  Chapter 9 addresses partisanship in this increasingly 
salient domain of political philosophy and practice.  That parties might successfully organise 
transnationally is an idea often met with scepticism.  The chapter argues that while certain 
favourable conditions are indeed absent in this domain, this implies not that partisanship is 
impossible but that it is likely to be marked by certain traits.  Specifically, it will tend to be 
episodic, socially diffuse, and delocalised in its ideational content.  These tendencies affect 
the normative expectations one can attach to it.  Transnational partisanship, the chapter 
argues, should be valued as a transitional phenomenon, as a pathway to a more acceptable 
international order, rather than as a desirable thing in itself. 
What does our account of the normative structure and value of partisanship suggest 
for the practical configuration of a party?  In Chapter 10, our concluding chapter, we trace 
out the organisational implications that follow from the arguments previously made.  
Accepting that organisation can be a matter of reasoned design and not just the outcome of 
functional imperatives, we suggest a number of principles of organisation consistent with the 
meaning of partisanship as previously described and outline the kinds of practical 
arrangement that may serve them.  Issues of salience in many realworld parties – e.g. to do 
with the role of material incentives, the burdens of membership, the place of hierarchy, 
coercion and intra-party deliberation, and the consolidation of commitments in a party 
constitution – are points given critical discussion.  By unpacking the normative stakes bound 
up in these organisational questions, the chapter reconnects the study of partisan ethics with 
some of the key challenges facing parties in the contemporary world.  
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Chapter 1 
The Partisan Claim 
 
 
 
One of the intriguing properties of political language is that many of its key terms are used 
both to express things as they should be and things as they are.  To pick just a few examples: 
citizen, democracy, law, legitimacy, state, constitution and community – each is commonly 
used to describe both a political ideal and its approximation in everyday life.  Democracy is 
studied as a set of practices as they exist in a given realworld setting, yet typically with an 
understanding that the concept is not reducible to those practices.  They are democratic to the 
extent they retain traces of an ideal, however contested and evolving it may be.  In like fashion 
the law is approached positively as a set of practices engaged in by judiciaries, lawyers, 
legislators and others, but generally with a clear sense that it is not just the sum total of these 
activities: that the law is something discovered as well as made.  An empirical and a normative 
tendency coexists in these concepts and many others by which politics is organised and lived.  
This fact reflects, amongst other things, the twin impulses that run through political analysis: 
to criticise reality and to account for it. 
In the case of the political party, the dual character of the concept tends to be 
overlooked, at least in contemporary study.  The party is typically approached as a mainly 
empirical phenomenon, as a concretely-existing mode of organisation to which our concept 
of party should be adjusted so as best to describe it.  Typologies highlight the changing forms 
of partisan activity – from cadre to mass party, catch-all to cartel party – often with the explicit 
suggestion that no particular form should be privileged as the superior instantiation of an 
ideal.  The concept evolves, untethered from any notion of what a party should be.  This 
empiricisation of the idea of party corresponds, one may add, to its centrality in political 
science and its weak presence in political philosophy. 
This chapter aims to show why the party should be recognised as a normative concept 
as well as an empirical one.  In reflecting on the meaning of party and partisanship, one should 
keep in view both the evolution of an historical set of practices and how those practices in 
their most defensible form can raise and respond to normative questions.  While its changing 
organisational features are of singular significance, they should be appraised in the context of 
the ends that the party might in principle be expected to serve.  Only by balancing these two 
considerations does one arrive at a category with useful critical potential.    
In line with this point of departure, the chapter examines what gets lost in a one-
sidedly empirical conception of the party, in particular one that reduces partisanship to the 
activities of those holding membership in an organisation contesting elections.  It looks at the 
good reasons for adopting a richer account that includes the kinds of political principles and 
aims agents seek to advance, and that highlights the interaction not just of those who share 
formal organisational ties but of those operating at the boundaries of the membership group.  
As we go on to argue, exploring partisanship’s normative dimension is to some degree an act 
of retrieval, as it was with this aspect to the fore that the concept of party first emerged and 
was theorised in the modern setting.  The chapter examines some of its intellectual origins as 
a normative as well as empirical category, before outlining the conception to be carried 
forward in this work. 
Appreciation of the two dimensions, empirical and normative, matters especially in a 
time when many of the actors that go by the name of party in contemporary politics are widely 
thought, by publics and scholars alike, to have significant and perhaps fatal shortcomings.  
Scepticism towards the particulars leads to scepticism towards the idea.  Under such 
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conditions it is particularly important that theoretical discussion of the value of partisanship 
is not distorted by the problems that attach to it in specific incarnations – any more than 
theoretical discussions of citizenship, democracy or the law should be distorted by the 
limitations of their practical instantiations.  To defend partisanship is not to defend it in all its 
contemporary forms. 
 
 
The Party as Observed: Tendencies in Empirical Study 
 
Partisanship describes a collective phenomenon: this is the common point of departure for all 
that has been written on it.  At the heart of it is some form of coordination between individuals 
committed to similar political ideas.  There can be no party of one, no partisan without 
partisan peers.  Moreover, this cooperation unfolds under conditions of conflict.  Partisans 
unite to oppose those with whom they are at odds.  Their coordination is outward-facing.  Yet 
what the unity of the partisan collective consists in is less certain.  One can usefully probe the 
variety of positions on this question by looking first at the empirical political science of the 
party as pursued in comparative politics, before going on to recall some older views. 
One of the most widely-adopted conceptions in twentieth-century scholarship saw the 
party as the organised expression of group interest.  What unified a set of partisans was their 
relation to the social structure.  In the words of an early exponent of the view, ‘each [party] 
is the representative, the special champion, of a particular group of citizens for whose … 
interests it seeks the recognition and fostering care of the state …’6  The party is a conduit by 
which social facts find political expression: each defends the interests associated with a 
particular segment of society, be it a class, status group, or hybrid formation.  The perspective 
discounts the rhetoric by which parties might claim to be advancing generalizable principles 
and aims: whatever they say, they represent the part and no more.7  In North America 
especially, this broadly sociological perspective would become widely influential in the mid-
twentieth century in the context of theories of interest-group pluralism.8  In Europe, in a 
distinct but related form, it would find early expression in the work of Max Weber,9 before 
developing more fully as the ‘cleavage theory’ of partisanship, in which political 
constituencies are taken to be a function of underlying societal divisions rooted in interests 
and sedimented cultural oppositions.10 
																																																								
6 Morse, Anson (1896), ‘What is a Party?’, Political Science Quarterly 11 (1), p.77; cf. p.80: ‘the true end of 
party – the end, I would repeat, of which it is itself conscious – is, in ordinary times, to promote not the 
general interest, but the interest of a class, a section or some one of the many groups of citizens which are to 
be found in every state in which there is political life, an interest which is always something other – and 
generally, though not always something less – than the national interest’; p.81: ‘In a general sense what the 
state undertakes to do for the people, a party undertakes to do for a group. To promote the national interest, 
that is, the interest that is common to all, is the immediate end of the state; to promote the group interest is the 
immediate end of party.’ 
7 Morse (‘What is a Party?’, p.77) was keen to present his as an empirical conception: distancing himself from 
the Burkean conception we shall come to, and any likeminded normative conception of partisanship, he states: 
‘if true, the definition must hold of every party, both present and past.’ 
8 E.g. Dahl, Robert (1966), ‘Some Explanations’, in Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western 
Democracies (New Haven: Yale UP), pp.348-86. 
9 Weber, Max (1978), ‘The Distribution of Power within the Political Community: Class, Status, Party’, in 
Economy and Society Vol. 2, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: UCP), pp.926-40.  
10 See e.g. Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan (1967), ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter 
alignments: an Introduction’, in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.) Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national 
perspectives (New York: Free), pp.1-64; also Lipset, Seymour (1960), Political Man: the Social Basis of 
Politics (New York: Doubleday). 
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Particularly in the latter twentieth century, it was clear to many observers of western 
democracy that not all, perhaps not even most, of the groups contesting elections could easily 
be grasped in this way as the political expression of social structure.  New emphasis came to 
be put rather on the party as a network of elites, unified by their common desire for the power 
and prestige of political office.11  Sometimes known as the economic view of the party, due 
to its emphasis on utilitarian motivation and adoption of methods from the study of market 
behaviour, this family of approaches saw partisans first and foremost as interest-maximisers, 
building support to advance their own personal position.  Their appeal to a wider public took 
the form of chasing the preferences of the ‘median voter’: rather than consistently 
representing a defined social group, they would adopt whatever opinions seemed conducive 
to majority support.  This highly pragmatic orientation, and the programmatic contradictions 
it might lead to, were evoked by those who saw partisans as engaged in a ‘catch-all’ effort to 
assemble an electoral majority through the aggregation of disparate preferences.12 
That a party might also be organised around a set of principled political commitments, 
reducible neither to the interests of a social group nor to the self-serving rhetoric of elites, 
was a possibility few observers of this period would dispute.  A distinctive class of 
‘ideological’ parties was acknowledged as a real feature of politics in electoral and non-
electoral contexts, and often associated with the European left.13  A minority strand of thought 
even articulated this as the essence of the party idea and a necessary foundation of 
representative democracy.14  Such a grouping was typically treated as a curiosity however.  
Ideological parties were rare, and hardly able therefore to act as a prototype for empirical 
analysis in general.  
Faced with these differing understandings of what the unity of a party might lie in, the 
most common response in comparative politics as a whole has been to map these different 
conceptions onto different kinds of party.  A pluralist approach has been taken.15  Thus the 
major surveys of the field have tended to distinguish between parties of group representation 
(described variously as ‘class parties’, ‘ethnic parties’ and ‘cleavage-based parties’), parties 
of elite convenience (including ‘clientelist parties’, ‘brokerage parties’, ‘electoral-
professional parties’ and ‘personalistic parties’), and parties of principle (sometimes termed 
‘ideological’ or ‘programmatic’).16  These distinctions are typically combined with additional 
ones to do with organisational structure, and used to note the varying preponderance of 
different types in different national and temporal contexts.  The concept of party is thereby 																																																								
11 See e.g. Downs, Anthony (1957b), An Economic Theory of Democracy (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley);  
Schlesinger, Joseph A. (1991), Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan)..   
12 Kirchheimer, Otto (1966), 'The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems' in La Palombara 
and Weiner (eds) Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: PUP). 
13 See e.g. Duverger, Maurice (1954), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activities in the Modern State 
(London: Methuen).   
14 See e.g. Bobbio, Norberto (1987), ‘Representative and Direct Democracy’, in The Future of Democracy 
(Oxford: Blackwell), p.51.  The point is well made also by Sartori, albeit in one of the less well heeded 
sections of his book on parties and party systems (Sartori, Giovanni (1976), Parties and Party Systems 
(Cambridge: CUP),,p.26; see also Chapter 2 below).   
15 Such a move recalls Hume’s distinction between parties ‘from interest’, ‘from principle’ and ‘from 
affection’ – a distinction intended to clarify the dangers he associated with partisanship (Hume, David ([1748] 
1998), ‘Of parties in general’ and ‘Of the parties of Great Britain’, in Hume: Political Essays ed. Knud 
Haakonssen (Cambridge: CUP), pp.33-39 and pp.40-5). 
16 See e.g. Diamond and Gunther, who identify 15 kinds of party as part of their contribution to an 
‘empirically more comprehensive and accurate set of party types that are more truly reflective of real-world 
variations among parties’ (Diamond, Larry and Richard Gunther (2003), ‘Species of Political Parties: A New 
Typology’, Party Politics 9 (2), p.171); see also Katz, Richard S. and William J. Crotty (eds.) (2006), 
Handbook of Party Politics, (London: SAGE), esp. Introduction.  A valuable recent discussion of party types 
is Scarrow, Susan (2014), Beyond Party Members: Changing Approaches to Partisan Mobilization (Oxford: 
OUP), esp. chap 2.  
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applied to a very diverse range of political groupings, whose common denominator is that 
they contest elections.17   At the micro level, the unity of the party form has been further 
weakened by disaggregating it into separate elements.  In V.O. Key’s influential account, 
what one actually encountered was a fractured phenomenon: the ‘party-in-the-electorate’, the 
‘party-as organisation’ and the ‘party-in-government’.18  Only sometimes could they be 
expected to form a meaningful whole. 
As an effort to record the empirical variety of actors participating in the political 
institutions of western democracy, these approaches have much to be said for them.  It is 
exactly this variety of forms that confronts the observer.  That some political groups have a 
more distinct social base than others, and that some seem little more than the vehicles of a 
detached political class or a charismatic individual, are reasonable observations for anyone 
surveying the political landscape of modern democracy.   
Furthermore, an even-handed attitude that treats all these different actors as variations 
of the same (i.e. as different kinds of party) has some clear advantages for empirical research.  
By taking an inclusive approach to the range of motivations that can inspire collective action 
and the forms that may ensue, one can hope to keep at bay some of the interpretive choices 
that need to be made whenever deciding what counts as a party.  The empiricist goal of 
replicable data collection is more easily preserved.  Aspirations to value neutrality can also 
be maintained.  The scientist can disavow normative claims about what a party should be and 
instead seek to engage with reality in all its sheer variety.  A large data set is another welcome 
consequence.  Comparative analysis is facilitated if one treats all political groupings that 
contest elections as one or another variety of party: there will always then be a sufficient 
plurality of parties in any given national context that one can speak confidently of a ‘party 
system’, and thereby make comparisons with other such systems.19   
The preference for minimal definitions of the party is also the expression of some 
underlying intuitions about democracy.  Though declaredly empirical, it is not without 
normative ancestry.  It corresponds with a line of thought that holds political conflict to be 
tolerable to the extent it is not primarily about contending principled commitments but a 
process of mediating between competing interests.20  By evoking party democracy in its 
normal form as the interaction of diverse political groupings, only a minority of which are 
consistently wedded to generalisable principles and aims, such accounts conjure a more stable 
political order.   
The inclusive approach to what constitutes a party comes at a high cost, however.  Part 
of that cost may be to empirical analysis itself.  Typologies of partisanship that give equal 
status to ideas- and interest-based parties risk overlooking the reflexive aspect of all forms of 
collective action.  Even groups which speak only the language of interests are in no sense 
merely a passive medium of representation.  Interests have to be selected, defined and 
articulated compatibly with a certain idea of advantage, and it seems hardly possible to 
perform this role without reference, even if implicit, to principles of some kind – in question 																																																								
17 Hence the prominence of elections in political-scientific definitions of party: e.g. Epstein, Leon (1967), 
Political Parties in Western Democracies (London: Pall Mall), p.9: a political party is ‘any group, however 
loosely organized, seeking to elect government officeholders under a given label’; also Aldrich, John (1995), 
Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Parties in America (Chicago: UCP), pp.283-4: ‘Political 
parties can be seen as coalitions of elites to capture and use political office.’ 
18 Key, V. O. (1942), Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell). 
19 The classic account of party systems remains Sartori, ‘Parties and Party Systems’.  An intelligent recent 
addition in this tradition is Ezrow, Lawrence (2010), Linking Citizens and Parties: How Electoral Systems 
Matter for Political Representation (Oxford: OUP). 
20 Classically, see Hume, ‘Of Parties in General’; see also Kelsen, Hans (2013), The Essence and Value of 
Democracy, (eds.) Nadia Urbinati and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), p.40, pp.69-
70. 
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will rather be the nature of those principles.  Seeing parties primarily as mechanisms of 
representation, these sociological accounts tend to assume a largely unidirectional 
relationship between the forms of subjecthood existing in society and those in the political 
arena.   They are treated already as groups for themselves as well as in themselves, in other 
words: the role of the party in developing this self-consciousness, by creatively articulating 
political subjects, is often under-specified.21  
The problem is also a normative one however.  Though well suited to certain kinds of 
empirical ambition, a stripped-down conception of the party as any kind of group contesting 
elections dulls sensitivity to some of the key normative questions at stake.  The practices of 
a given moment, in all their empirical specificity, come to eclipse the ideals behind them.22  
A normatively defensible concept of partisanship must reject this evenhandedness and 
privilege a certain kind of ideas-based grouping grounded in principled commitment.  It must 
include at the core of the idea of party the pursuit of political visions irreducible to the self-
centred aims of sectoral groups or to personal interests.23  Such criteria are important not just 
for locating the political worth of partisanship – notably, what it might contribute to ideals of 
democracy – but for identifying why it is reasonable for individuals to associate with parties 
in the first place.  Relatedly, in place of a predominant focus on party systems, where the 
normative ends of actors inevitably pale beside the concessions that may arise in the course 
of their interaction, we need to retrain our vision on the standards to which partisans properly 
aspire.  
To begin to see why this is so, it is worth considering an older tradition of thinking 
about partisanship in which its normative significance is more visible. 
 
 
Normative Roots of the Party Concept 
 
When party as a concept and practice first emerged in the modern world in the latter 
eighteenth century, its defining characteristic was widely thought to lie in the kind of ends it 
pursued, not the organisational means by which it pursued them.24  A party was conceived 
first and foremost as a community of shared principle.  Partly this can be explained by the 
weak organisational structure of the early parties, notably as they emerged in Britain and the 
US.  As groups of individuals located primarily in the legislature, they displayed little in the 
way of a functional differentiation of roles, so it made little sense to define them by their 																																																								
21 For a useful critique from within sociology of the idea that parties merely translate conflicts from the social 
to the political sphere, see DeLeon, Cedric, Manali Desai and Cihan Tuğal (2015) (eds.), Building Blocs: How 
Parties Organize Society (Stanford: Stanford UP). 
22 One is reminded of Marcuse’s critique of ‘one-dimensional thought’: cf. Marcuse, Herbert (1964 / 2002), 
One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (London: Routledge), chap. 1.  
23 A well-known twentieth-century precedent for an expressly normative conception of partisanship is the 
APSA report on ‘responsible parties’: see APSA (1950), ‘Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A 
Report of the Committee on Political Parties’, American Political Science Review 44 (3), Part 2, Supplement. 
24 Cf. Mansfield, Harvey C. (1965a), Statesmanship and Party Government: A Study of Burke and Bolingbroke 
(Chicago: UCP), p.17; Ball, Terence (1989), ‘Party’, in Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds.) Political 
Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: CUP), pp.169ff.; Beyme, Klaus von (1978), ‘Partei, 
Faktion’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.) Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vol. 4 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta), p.688 (by the early eighteenth-century, in England ‘parties’ differ from ‘factions’ 
because the latter term is reserved for ‘small groups … that concentrate on the modalities of gaining power 
and influence without offering a comprehensive vision for the exercise of rule’ (author trans.)); see also 
Rosenblum, Nancy (2008), On the Side of the Angels An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship (Princeton: 
PUP); Hofstadter, Richard (1969), The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the 
United States, 1780-1840 (Berkeley: UCP); Pombeni, Paolo (1994), Partiti e sistemi politici nella storia 
contemporanea (Bologna: Il Mulino). 
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structural characteristics.  But the emphasis on the association’s ends corresponded equally 
to the belief amongst those sympathetic to these emerging entities that their distinctive 
contribution to public life lay in how they united individuals around shared principles.  They 
divided the realm along lines of freely-chosen opinion, quite in contrast to the divisions of 
religion associated with the seventeenth century, and equally in contrast to divisions of private 
interest.25  Our aim here is not to give an historical account of how these views emerged and 
the debates in which they were deployed, but rather to indicate the broad outlines of a 
normative conception of party. 
The classic reference-point is of course the work of Edmund Burke.  He famously 
defined party as ‘a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national 
interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed’.26  This conception puts 
the ends of the association to the fore.  The group is defined by agreement in political ideas: 
‘principle’ is what gives shape to the unity of the party.  These ideas are generalisable: the 
good pursued is one possible to construe as the ‘national interest’, not an evidently personal 
or sectoral one.27  As he goes on to elaborate: ‘every honourable connection will avow it is 
their first purpose, to pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into 
such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the 
power and authority of the state.’28  The aim to gain control of political institutions is essential 
to the partisan method, but it is instrumental to the furthering of ‘common plans’ grounded in 
shared opinion.  It is these shared, generalisable principles and aims which mark out the party 
as an ‘honourable connection’.  Praising the Whigs of Queen Anne’s reign, Burke wrote: 
‘They believed that no men could act with effect, who did not act in concert; that no men 
could act in concert who did not act with confidence; and that no men could act with 
confidence, who were not bound together by common opinions, common affections, and 
common interests.’29  Rather than as a way to oil the wheels of organization, shared 
commitments were cast as the foundation of the partisan endeavour. 
Was it plausible to speak of the party in this high-minded fashion?  Many doubted the 
empirical validity of this view, a concern expressed in scepticism about the possibility of 
distinguishing party and faction.30  A common suspicion was that few political groups could 
adequately be described as ‘party’ if this demanding conception was to be applied,31 and that, 
echoing the earlier scepticism of Lord Bolingbroke,32 those that did fit this description would 
quickly degenerate into something less noble. As the next chapter illustrates, such concerns 
were hardly misplaced: empirically, such tendencies were real.  Yet they did not cancel the 
ideal of party against which existing political associations might be judged. 
The reason Burke put such emphasis on this concept of party was because he 
considered it necessary to the institutionalisation of popular sovereignty and liberty.  Recent 
scholarship suggests his thoughts on the theme first developed in the 1750s, in response to 																																																								
25 On the importance of settlement of the religious question to the acceptance and then celebration of party 
difference, see Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government, pp.8-9.  
26 Burke, Edmund ([1770] 1998), ‘Thoughts on the cause of the present discontents’, in A Philosophical 
Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful and Other Pre-revolutionary Writings 
(London: Penguin), p.271.   
27 Note though that Burke assumes the national frame: a contemporary understanding of ‘generalisable’, 
sensitive to the transnational, may have to pose things differently. 
28 Burke, ‘Thoughts on the cause’.  As Mansfield notes (Statesmanship and Party Government, pp.181-3), 
implicit in Burke’s conception is that more than one party can advance a plausible claim: it is a defence of 
parties rather than the singular party. 
29 Burke, ‘Thoughts on the cause’. 
30 See Chapter 2; also Rosenblum, On the Side of Angels. 
31 Cf. Morse, ‘What is a Party?’. 
32 Cf. Bolingbroke, Viscount (1733 / 1997), ‘A Dissertation on Parties’, ‘Letter on the Spirit of Patriotism’ and 
‘On the Idea of a Patriot King’, in David Armitage (ed.), Political Writings, (Cambridge: CUP), p.37.   
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the increasing concentration of power in the hands of William Pitt;33 their mature expression 
in 1770 was conversely a response to the monarchical ambition of George III.34  Though the 
contexts were quite different, the common reasoning was that only strong, principled 
association could adequately protect the mixed constitution from the overweening and 
arbitrary power of a dominant individual.35  Firm party ties grounded in principle would 
empower the Commons by protecting its members from undue influence by the mighty; this 
in turn would ensure government was broadly in tune with the opinion of the people.36  To 
put one’s faith rather in the virtue of individuals – the king, his courtiers and unattached MPs 
– would be unwise.  Party discipline and the rules of association were to be trusted over the 
good intentions of the few.  In this sense his concept of the party, however demanding, was 
born partly of political realism.  To be sure, as a partisan himself, by describing partisanship 
in these terms Burke was putting the actions of himself and his fellow Whigs in a favourable 
light, casting them as the defenders of the national interest.  His was undoubtedly an argument 
with a partisan tinge.  But it made sense only in the context of a larger preoccupation with 
averting tyranny and securing the conditions of popular self-rule. 
Views not dissimilar to Burke’s were expressed in the nineteenth century by a number 
of continental-European thinkers.37  The German-based Swiss jurist (and active partisan38) 
Johann Kaspar Bluntschli likewise developed a conception of party in which what marked it 
out from competing political groups was its associates’ common aim to pursue the good of 
the whole (here understood as the state, society and the ‘fatherland’) rather than the good of 
the part.  Parties, he suggested, are ‘free social groups’ (‘freie … Gesellschaftsgruppen’) 
which are ‘allied for common political action by a shared attitude and aim.’39   Depending on 
its orientation either to the good of the state or to special interest, ‘the identical association 
will be either a political party or a faction.  It has taken the path of faction as soon as self-
aggrandisement or cantankerousness overwhelms love for the fatherland, and the party 
consciously and deliberately fails to serve the good of the state and society in general, but 
rather does that which is dictated by its passions.’40  Again, organisation played an important 
but supporting role: ‘if a party wants to fulfil its aims and attain the goals for which it united, 
it must to some degree organise itself as an active community and act as a close-knit collective 
in public life, in electoral meetings, and in councils.’41   
An emphasis on the distinctive goals of partisanship as marking it out from other types 
of association was shared by many in this period.  Another jurist in the German tradition 
writing on the concept of party, one who influenced Bluntschli and one who was also himself 																																																								
33 See Bourke, Richard (2012), ‘Party, Parliament, and Conquest in Newly Ascribed Burke Manuscripts’, The 
Historical Journal 55, pp.619-52. 
34 Bourke, Richard (2015), Empire and Revolution: The Political Life of Edmund Burke (Princeton: PUP), Part 
III, chapter 5, section 5. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.  Burke’s biographer convincingly argues the argument was ultimately about popular sovereignty, not 
simply an attempt to defend aristocratic privilege.  As Whigs like Burke saw it, ‘in their hands, government 
was a tool of the people as much as it was lever of the king.’  He continues: ‘The people might be misled in 
their judgments, but their sentiments were mostly sound: “Whenever the people have a feeling [said Burke], 
they commonly are in the right.”  It was the job of a representative assembly to ascertain that feeling. … The 
House of Commons was at once a representative and a deliberative chamber, which had to echo the attitudes 
of the people without being bound by their proposals.’  See also Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party 
Government, esp. pp.138ff., pp.157ff. 
37 Bluntschli, Johann Kaspar (1869), Charakter und Geist der Politischen Parteien (Nördlingen: C.H. Beck).  
A useful overview is Pombeni, Partiti e sistemi politici.   
38 He allied himself with the Conservative- Liberal party of Zurich in the 1830s-40s.  
39 Bluntschli, Charakter und Geist, p.9, author trans. 
40 Bluntschli, Charakter und Geist, p.11, author trans. 
41 Bluntschli, Charakter und Geist, p.12, author trans. 
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a partisan, was Robert von Mohl.42  He too saw the distinctiveness of this political form, in 
contrast to ‘factions’ and ‘groupings’, to lie in the specific kind of principles and aims it 
defined itself by.  As he put it: ‘a state party is the sum of all those who want to direct state 
power in a certain way, or who want to establish certain public institutions and conditions.  
Depending on the specific circumstances, they want to achieve this either by lawfully taking 
over the government itself or, at the minimum, by exercising a decisive influence over it.  A 
party is oriented towards a public ideal, and promises that realising this will serve the welfare 
of all – including, of course, the welfare of its own members; but it is not directly and 
exclusively a selfish aim.  A party is conscious of its goal and openly avows it, and seeks to 
win as many followers as possible.’43  For von Mohl, the party as organisation was very much 
a secondary aspect: indeed, his concern was that an excess of organisation might undermine 
the party as normative agent.44 
To assert that parties by their nature were oriented to generalizable principles and aims 
was not necessarily to deny that more partial motivations might be joined to this.45  A sense 
of the ideal standards of partisanship did not exclude political realism.  Alexis de Tocqueville 
advanced a conception sensitive to both: ‘when the citizens entertain different opinions upon 
subjects which affect the whole country alike, each for instance, as the principles upon which 
the government is to be conducted, then distinctions arise which may correctly be styled 
parties.’46  Shared political commitments were the essence of such parties: ‘The political 
parties which I style great are those which cling to principles more than to consequences; to 
general, and not to especial cases; to ideas, and not to men.’47  Yet partial motivations were 
never absent: ‘in them [great parties], private interest, which always plays the chief part in 
political passions, is more studiously veiled under the pretext of the public good; and it may 
even by sometimes concealed from the eyes of the very person whom it excites and impels.’48  
Private interest was, he felt, unquestionably the animating force behind the empirical political 
groupings he encountered in America.  But in the case of the higher form of party, the great 
party, while it remained a reconciliation of the private and the public, an orientation to the 
latter was nonetheless a defining feature.  It was here, in its capacity to cultivate in citizens a 
concern for the public good and to protect them from domination by the most powerful, that 
a party’s potential to contribute to popular sovereignty lay.49 
It would later become a trope of socialist thought that a party might simultaneously 
advance the good of a social group and be the vehicle of a universal good.  Marxist theories 																																																								
42 von Mohl, Robert (1859 / 1966), ‘Die Parteien im Staate’, in Klaus von Beyme (ed.) Robert von Mohl: 
Politische Schriften (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag).  He associated with the liberal Reichspartei as member 
of the Reichstag in the 1870s. 
43 von Mohl, ‘Die Parteien im Staate’, p.239, author trans.  On the irreducibility of the party to the interests of 
family and estate, see also Rosenkranz, Karl (1843), Über den Begriff der politischen Partei (Königsberg: 
Theile). 
44 In nineteenth-century Germany in particular, the party as community of conviction 
(‘Gesinnungsgemeinschaft’) was typically emphasised over the party as organisation: cf. von Beyme, ‘Partei, 
Faktion’, p.699. 
45 Discussing von Mohl’s thought on this, see von Beyme’s introduction in von Mohl, ‘Die Parteien im 
Staate’, p.xxxv.  
46 Tocqueville, Alexis de (2002), Democracy in America, trans. and ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop (Chicago: UCP), Vol. 1, Part 2, chap. 2, p.167.   
47 Ibid.  Cf. Bonetto, Gerald M. (1981), ‘Alexis de Tocqueville’s Concept of Political Parties’, American 
Studies 22 (2), p.65. 
48 Ibid.  That Tocqueville’s realism here is not intended to dissolve the great / minor party distinction is 
evident from the sentence that follows: ‘Minor parties are, on the other hand, generally deficient in political 
faith.  As they are not sustained or dignified by a lofty purpose, they ostensibly display the egotism of their 
character in their actions.’  Note that Burke too had a place for private interest in the party (for discussion: 
Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government, p.188). 
49 Cf. Bonetto, ‘Tocqueville’s Concept’, pp.74ff. 
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of political mobilisation are typically treated as theories of class action, and there can be no 
denying that a much stronger link is drawn by many Marxist thinkers between party and group 
interest.50  But for a large number of active socialists of the latter nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the point was exactly that the greater good of society as a whole, properly 
understood, was aligned with the interests of the working class.  The sense in a party seeking 
to advance the latter was that it thereby advanced a cause irreducible to proletarian interest. 
Ramsay MacDonald - co-founder and theoretician of the British Labour Party, and later its 
first Prime Minister – provides powerful illustration.  ‘Socialism,’ he wrote in his 1907 work 
of the same name, ‘is no class movement.  Socialism is a movement of opinion, not an 
organization of status.  It is not the rule of the working-class; it is the organization of the 
community.’51  His portrayal of the Labour Party in his 1919 piece on Parliament and 
Revolution expands on the same theme: ‘it [the Party] believes in the class conflict as a 
descriptive fact, but it does not regard it as supplying a political method.  It strives to 
transform through education, through raising the standards of mental and moral qualities, 
through the acceptance of programmes by reason of their justice, rationality and wisdom. …  
It walks with the map of Socialism in front of it and guides its steps by the compass of 
democracy.’52  Eduard Bernstein was equally emphatic that the goal of Germany’s Social 
Democrats was to bring the goods of political citizenship to the masses and thereby 
reconfigure society, not merely defend a section of it.53  Such partisans, one may say, were 
radicalising the already-present connection in political thought between partisanship and the 
idea of collective self-rule. Bound by its commitment to socialist goals, and with an educative 
as well as executive purpose, the party in their view was no more a mere interest group than 
it had been for Burke in the eighteenth century. 
What one sees then in these older views on the party, from Burke to MacDonald, is 
an emphasis on the defining significance of particular normative visions of the purpose of 																																																								
50 See e.g. Engels, Friedrich (1895 / 1978), ‘The Tactics of Social Democracy’, in Robert W Tucker (ed.) The 
Marx/Engels Reader (New York: Norton), esp. p.557.  Note however that the merging of class interest with 
the interest of society as a whole is a possibility already present in Marx’s early writing on revolution: see 
Marx, Karl (1843 / 1994), ‘From the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, in Joseph O’Malley (ed.) 
Marx: Early Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP), pp.1-27.  Note also that in Gramsci’s influential account, 
parties do not simply express the existing sectoral interests of society but are crucial to the making of a 
socially progressive class.  In addition to his key text ‘The Modern Prince’ (Gramsci, Antonio (2011), Prison 
Notebooks, Vols. 1-III, ed. and trans. Joseph Buttigieg (New York: Columbia UP)), see Gramsci, Antonio 
(1921), ‘I partiti e la massa’, L'Ordine Nuovo, 25 Sept.: ‘Politically, the great masses do not exist unless they 
are incorporated into political parties: the changes of opinion to which the former are subject as a result of 
pressure from dominant economic forces are interpreted by parties; the latter are in turn split, first in different 
currents (tendenze), and then again in a multiplicity of new organic parties’.  
51 MacDonald, in Barker, Bernard (1972), Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings (Allen Lane, London), 
p.162. 
52 Ibid., p.240. 
53 Bernstein, Eduard (1899 / 1993), The Preconditions of Socialism, ed. Henry Tudor (Cambridge: CUP), 
p.146: ‘Social Democracy does not want to break up civil society and make all its members proletarians 
together; rather, it ceaselessly labours to raise the worker from the social position of a proletarian to that of a 
citizen (Bürger) and thus to make citizenship universal.’  See also, from an earlier generation, the co-founder 
of the German SDAP August Bebel outlining his party’s goals in 1870: ‘since it is not a question of 
oppression of the minority by the majority but rather of the equal treatment and equalisation of all, one cannot 
speak of a situation of class- or status-group-domination, as the working class supposedly seeks.  On the 
contrary, what is sought is a reasonable democratic society the likes of which the world has never seen. … The 
state should therefore be transformed from a state based on class rule into a people’s state, into a state in 
which there are no privileges of any kind … The people’s state should be brought about initially by the 
education of the masses regarding social and political conditions, and this education can be advanced by the 
organization (founding) of party associations, trade unions etc, the creation and dissemination of suitable 
newspapers and publications etc.’  (Bebel, August (1870), Unsere Ziele: eine Streitschrift gegen die 
‘Demokratische Korrespondenz’ (Leipzig: Thiele), author trans.) 
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political institutions.  Principled commitments were considered essential to this form of 
political subjecthood: it was in these that the party’s claim to normative value was grounded.  
As we have seen, such a view could be endorsed by liberals, conservatives and socialists 
alike.  Empirical politics might fall well short of this norm, with other types of motivation 
coming to the fore.  But it was against this standard that empirical groups should be judged 
and, where necessary, found wanting.  Implied by this view was that the institutional 
expression of partisanship – the party as organisation – was secondary to its shared ideas.  
The unity of the partisan community lay in its shared principled commitments.  The 
coordinated effort to control state institutions (increasingly focused on the contestation of 
elections) was the means to achieve these ends. 
Some may wonder whether there was not a significant risk implicit in these 
approaches.  By locating the defining features of partisanship primarily in the principles and 
aims advanced, these thinkers seemed to be directing one either to a highly political 
assessment of whether certain commitments genuinely serve the public good, or – no less 
problematic – to the study of intentions, and thus to something very difficult to ascertain in 
the particular instance.54  Were these theorists then not opening an unbridgeable divide 
between the normative and the empirical, such that a party could only be imagined, never 
confidently observed?  The problem is one we shall return to.  Arguably the subsequent 
empiricisation of the party concept in political science was a response to a valid concern, 
albeit a response overdrawn. 
The main conclusion of this section though is the following.  What one sees by 
recalling these older conceptions of the party is that, in the course of empirical study in the 
twentieth century, the word party came to be applied to groupings from which thinkers of an 
earlier period would have withheld the term.  When contemporary scholars extend typologies 
of parties to include ‘cleavage representation parties’, centred on the interests of a defined 
sectoral grouping, or ‘elite parties’ centred on the interests of a narrowly defined network of 
individuals, or ‘personalistic parties’ grounded not in shared ideas but the charisma of an 
individual, they are faithful to what one may encounter in empirical politics, but sacrifice the 
political ideal that originally lay at the heart of the partisan claim.  
 
 
Towards a reconciliation of the empirical and normative 
 
This brief overview of conceptions of party suggests the challenge is essentially the 
following.  A view that seeks to reflect the variety of political groupings that present 
themselves on the electoral scene, though it may be a useful basis for empirical observation 
and categorisation, risks emptying the idea of normative content.  By suggesting a basic 
equivalence between interest groups and communities of principle, it dignifies the former and 
devalues the latter, equalising what one has reason to keep separate.  A defence of party 
democracy is then weakened from the outset.  Preserving the normative specificity of 
partisanship means highlighting a certain kind of claim – that to be advancing political 
commitments of a principled kind.  Yet in adopting this more elevated view, clearly one needs 
to avoid arriving at a conception wholly detached from empirical study.  How then may one 
concretely proceed? 
In what follows we propose an understanding of partisanship as an ongoing 
associative practice formed and sustained by those sharing a particular interpretation of how 
power should be exercised and with what scope.55  We refer to the principles and aims that 																																																								
54 On problems arising from the ‘teleological prejudice’ in the study of parties, see Panebianco, Angelo (1988) 
Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: CUP), pp.4ff. 
55 The latter is especially relevant to the transnational dimension of partisanship to which we turn in Chapter 9. 
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inform these interpretations, along with the specific policies they give rise to, as shared 
political projects.  The partisan claim,56 always contestable – and acknowledged as such by 
the partisan – is that their project serves ends irreducible to the interests of a sectoral grouping.  
Associations are genuinely partisan to the extent that they appeal to principles and aims that 
are plausibly generalizable.  As well as direct efforts to promote the project that unites them 
– typically by seeking control of decision-making institutions – partisan activities involve 
seeking to convince a wider public of its appeal.  Faced with the countervailing projects of 
rival actors, partisans seek to persuade others that theirs is a cause worth aligning with. 
To speak of partisans’ orientation to a principled project is not to make application of 
the concept hang on knowledge of the intentions of those involved.  This orientation is a 
matter of affirmed commitment rather than private motivation.  It takes the form of a visible 
claim, revealed in the kinds of statement a collective produces, the justifications it advances, 
and how it evokes its addressee.  Claims based on the appeal to generalizable principles and 
aims are discernibly different from those grounded in sectoral interest, even if they may 
envelop them.57  They are also distinguishable from other ways of rationalising political 
action such as appeals to necessity or to a population’s brute preferences.58  The important 
question then will be the extent to which a group acts in a way consistent with the claim it 
advances.  Authentic partisans are those who not only speak the language of generalisable 
principles and aims, but who can account for their commitments in these terms and can 
demonstrate how the actions they undertake plausibly serve these ends.59 
To seek to persuade others of the desirability of one’s projects is to accept their appeal 
may not be self-evident.  It is intrinsic to the partisan attitude as we understand it that partisans 
acknowledge in this way the contestability of their claims.  This is not to suggest they need 
doubt the rightness of their goals: partisans may be convinced of the superior appeal of those 
ideas to which they are committed.  But they acknowledge by their actions that their appeal 
needs to be argued as part of a public process of debate, persuasion and contestation, and that 
the conclusive demonstration of their superiority may fail even then due to differences in first 
principles and the limits of factual evidence.60  In empirical terms, this means partisanship 
finds its home in institutions that express the legitimacy of political contestation – where 
																																																								
56 The term ‘claim’ has recently been widely adopted as a way to think about representation (see Saward, 
Michael (2010), The Representative Claim (Oxford: OUP)).  While it is used there for a quite different set of 
purposes from our own (not least the aim to conceive representation in non-partisan contexts), some of the 
good reasons to use the term apply in both contexts, notably the emphasis it gives to the contestable character 
of the arguments actors advance (see also Saward, Michael (2006), ‘The Representative Claim’, 
Contemporary Political Theory 5 (3), p.302).  
57 On compound motivations that mix altruism with self-interest, and on their consistency with the party idea, 
see Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.22; also Tocqueville above. 
58 Some have argued the effect of a public audience is systematically to lead actors to abandon the language of 
self-interest, even as it continues to guide their actions (on the ‘civilising force of hypocrisy’, see Elster, Jon 
(1998), ‘Deliberation and Constitution making’, in Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: CUP), 
pp.97-122).  The familiarity of appeals of a non-principled kind usefully reminds that the partisan claim is by 
no means omnipresent.   
59 This applies, one may add, also to when partisans choose to compromise on their commitments (e.g. when 
entering coalition government).  True partisans are those who, when deviating from the letter of their 
commitments, acknowledge and justify this in terms of their commitments.  On compromise, see Chapter 8. 
60 On this point, see Chapter 3. See also Rawls’s discussion on the burdens of judgment in Rawls, John (2005), 
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia UP), pp.55-8; also Mason, Andrew (1993), Explaining Political 
Disagreement (Cambridge: CUP).  We may contrast this attitude to that of the technocrat or the populist, 
neither of whom accepts the contestability of claims (cf. Müller, Jan-Werner (2014), ‘“The People Must Be 
Extracted from Within the People”: Reflections on Populism’, Constellations 21 (4), p.490). 
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offices are elected, where disagreements are debated.  Such democratic institutions are at the 
core of partisan activity, whether as partisans find them, or as they hope to establish them.61  
Partisanship, we argue, should be valued both as a vehicle for channelling public 
justifications (seen from the outside) and as an associative practice required to sustain and 
enhance political commitment (seen from within). Although the processes of reason-giving 
that shape partisan commitments will feature concrete proposals for a particular time and 
place, their anchoring in more abstract normative visions gives them an open-ended quality 
that resists temporal delimitation.  Victories can be achieved in their name, but there is little 
prospect of their immediate fulfilment, and the gains made will need to be defended.62  
Partisanship is a practice oriented to long-term projects. 
Often this associative practice has at its centre a recognised organisation, the political 
party, conventionally understood, which embodies a distinctive collective will and gives it 
executive expression.  In thinking about the relationship between the party organisation and 
partisanship it may be useful to reflect on the analogy with a more familiar set of concepts: 
the state and the people. The state is what gives institutional expression to the collective will 
of a (political) people.  But a (political) people may also survive the collapse of the state or 
be only imperfectly reflected in it. Likewise, a party, understood merely as an organisation, 
is desirable to give executive expression to the collective will of partisans, but in 
reconstructing the meaning of partisanship it would be reductive to focus only on recognised 
and well-established parties.63 In some cases, a party with which partisans identify has existed 
in the past but is no longer politically prominent. In other cases, the formal organisation may 
only be there as an aspiration.  
Recognising partisanship’s orientation to principled commitments is important 
because this is likely to be central to its democratic rationale.  It is what invests it with the 
potential to give expression to the ideal of collective self-rule.  If, in the modern setting, this 
ideal entails that political authority should be engaged in a process of justification, such that 
the exercise of power is non-arbitrary, and susceptible to popular influence such that it is non-
exclusive, then the party as a collective promoting its demands in generalizable terms is 
arguably critical to its realisation.64  By developing and publicising normative views on how 
power should be exercised, parties at their best cultivate practices of justification.  Where 
public discourse is structured in terms of partisan claims, it gives reasons for political consent 
that are not systematically exclusive.  By articulating these views through associative 
practices that promote and enhance political commitment, partisans provide epistemic and 																																																								
61 Partisanship as we develop it involves a democratic orientation, even if it need not entail acceptance of a 
particular institutional settlement.  The partisans of a ‘one-party state’ are partisans only to the extent they do 
not seek to exclude rival perspectives: history suggests the combination is rare.  
62 On the long-termism of partisanship, see also Muirhead, Russell (2014), The Promise of Party in a 
Polarized Age (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP), p.139.  A single-issue campaign is qualitatively different from 
the kind of normative commitments we have in mind (see also below).  To be sure, a movement with one 
precisely-defined goal (e.g. to prevent the building of a nuclear-power reactor in a given locale) may 
sometimes choose to contest elections, but to the extent it does not subsequently develop a more wide-ranging, 
open-ended agenda, it does not constitute a partisan association in our sense.  On partisanship as a cross-
temporal project, see also Chap. 6. 
63 As Hans Kelsen puts it, ‘these social organizations usually retain an amorphous character. They take the 
form of loose associations or, often, lack any legal form at all. Yet, a substantial part of the governmental 
process occurs within these parties: Like subterranean springs feeding a river, their impulses usually 
decisively influence the direction of the governmental process before it surfaces and is channeled into a 
common riverbed in the popular assembly or parliament’ (Kelsen, Essence and Value, p.38). 
64 These points are elaborated more fully in the following chapters; see also White, Jonathan and Lea Ypi 
(2010), ‘Rethinking the Modern Prince: Partisanship and the Democratic Ethos’, Political Studies 58 (4), 
pp.809-28; Goodin, Robert E. (2008), ‘The Place of Parties’, in Goodin, Innovating Democracy (Oxford: 
OUP); Muirhead, The Promise of Party. 
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motivational support to the individual.  And by making government responsive to these 
commitments, they bring the demands of political justification to bear on decision-making 
such that normative ends can be feasibly advanced.  In this way, consistent with the 
expectation of early pioneers of the concept, the party may contribute to realising the 
democratic ideal of collective self-rule.  A society wholly sceptical of the partisan claim is 
either one that is sceptical of the very prospect of political justification, or one that can define 
politics only in negative terms as a balance struck between competing interests.65 
To conceive party in the terms suggested is to combine elements of the empirical and 
the normative.  It bears the imprint of historical experience: it is a conception that draws 
inspiration from the claims political agents have made for themselves, the ways they have 
acted in pursuit of their ends, and their self-understanding as partisans.  A variety of agents 
are plausible candidates for description in these terms: this conception does not limit itself to 
those of just one persuasion.  Groups as diverse as socialists, liberals and environmentalists 
may credibly be included, along with others we shall discuss.  Yet as an ideal type, our idea 
of party is intended not merely to describe reality but to regulate the observations and 
evaluations one makes of it – to draw attention to what partisans properly aspire to, and to 
highlight those cases where their actions fall short.66  Perhaps no existing political group fits 
the model precisely: how far a collective lives up to the partisan ideal will depend on its 
actions and discourse in context.  Indeed, any empirical application of this conception will 
have a debatable aspect to it.  In designating a particular group as a ‘party’, one is necessarily 
making a judgement about how credible its claim to ideas-based unity really is, and how far 
the ends it pursues can genuinely be said to be informed by generalizable principles and aims.  
Such choices will be complicated by the way groupings that might more appropriately be 
described under a different name may have strategic reasons to present themselves as 
‘parties’.  Sometimes one may need to question whether agents commonly referred to as 
parties are genuinely partisan in make-up.  But these challenges notwithstanding, it is an 
understanding of party that can be used both interpretatively and evaluatively, and thus as a 
bridge between theoretical and empirical study.67.  
To illustrate this balance of the empirical and normative, consider the following.  
History tells us that many a party has compromised its long-standing normative commitments, 
often in response to some change in its political environment.  Partisans have been moved to 
renege on their commitments so as to take immediate advantage of opportunities for 
institutional power, or to take advantage of the policy shifts made by their rivals.68  Not only 
have partisans opportunistically set their commitments aside, but sometimes they have 
allowed them to become incoherent, such that what the party stands for is unclear.  Actions 
of this kind highlight a gap between practice and ideal.  They indicate how partisans, as a 
matter of empirical fact, may be swayed by system-level developments that tug against their 
programmatic commitments.  At the same time, our intuitions tell us such moves must carry 
a burden of justification: they typically strike us as problematic, and we know that, taken to 																																																								
65 Cf. Mansfield, Harvey (1965b),‘Whether Party Government is Inevitable’, Political Science Quarterly 80 
(4), esp. p.529. 
66 Cf. Pombeni, Partiti; also Muirhead, The Promise of Party (pp.202ff.) on ‘high partisanship’, as distinct 
from the ‘low partisanship’ of ambition, strategizing etc. that is never far from it in practical settings. 
67 On the dislocation between the two in party scholarship: van Biezen, Ingrid and Saward, Michael (2008), 
‘Democratic Theorists and Party Scholars: Why They Don't Talk to Each Other, and Why They Should’, 
Perspectives on Politics 6 (1), pp.21-35. 
68 For an empirical test of theses about system-led party repositioning, see Adams, James and Zeynep Somer-
Topcu (2009), ‘Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Parties’ Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and 
the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies’, British Journal of Political 
Science 39 (4), pp.825-846.  
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an extreme, they are denounced by peers as compromising what partisanship is about.69  Such 
actions provoke because they are held to an ideal.  Rather than adapt the ideal to better fit the 
practice, our aim should be to improve our understanding of the ideal: to put some order in 
the intuitions that inform it, so that it can better act as a critical yardstick. 
To approach party in the way described is to maintain, at a conceptual level, a clear 
distinction between parties and interest groups.  Unlike the latter, the former define their 
activities in relation to a good irreducible to that of a sectional grouping.  They elaborate 
explicitly political identities, which citizens do not passively inherit as part of their social 
experiences and position within society, but towards which they orientate themselves 
reflexively based on an evaluation of the associated political objectives.70  Parties, in this 
view, are not primarily about interest representation – they are distinct from corporatist 
actors.71  What distinguishes them is not that they ‘aggregate’ interests, but that they offer 
principled justification for the particular combination of ends they promote. 
The conceptual distinction between party and social movement is less stark, but is also 
to be underlined.  Unlike the movement, the party seeks to harness directly the power of 
institutions.  While usually this means efforts to enter institutions (by taking seats in 
parliament, by sitting on the executive), it may also mean efforts to create them, as evidenced 
for instance in some forms of transnational partisanship.  In both cases, partisans differ from 
those who wish to influence governmental policies without giving explicit support to a 
particular party.72  This distinction concerning institutions must be understood in conjunction 
with parallel distinctions.  With its orientation to the public good, as something that involves 
weighing competing values, the party has reason to seek the legitimation that shared 
institutions can provide.  The partisan claim is unmistakeably contestable, as it touches on a 
wide range of political questions, and thus demands institutional validation.  A social 
movement, by contrast, may hope to bypass this requirement by advancing a more closely 
delimited, issue-specific set of demands.73  The concern to harness institutional power also 
means the party must be a long-term project.  Durability is required if one is to engage with 
the spaced-out rhythms of the democratic cycle.  To advance a political cause in this way, 
and to defend its achievements, requires patient efforts over a sustained period of time.  The 
social movement, by contrast, can choose spontaneity over durability. 
In this brief account of the specificity of partisanship, we have said nothing about the 
institutional and ethical constraints on it.  It might be wondered whether these are not a 
necessary component of any normatively-aware conception of what partisanship is.  It is 
sometimes observed, for instance, that the growing acceptance of party-based division in 
nineteenth-century societies, and thus the consolidation of party as a legitimate phenomenon, 
was closely linked to the emerging idea of loyal opposition.74  One of the ways a party was 
said to express its commitment to the ideals of political justification was by respecting its 
political adversaries, above all (though not only) by agreeing to be bound by common 
procedures.  Generalised consent to the existing institutional system amongst parties of 
government and opposition is widely regarded today as a necessary foundation of party 																																																								
69 Cf. Chapter 6. 
70 Cf. Urbinati, Nadia (2006), Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogies (Chicago: UCP), 
pp.36ff. 
71 On the latter: Schmitter, Philippe C. (1974) ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, Review of Politics, 36 (1), 
pp.85–131.  
72 Those holds true not just of social-movement activists (insofar as they are not also partisans) but 
independent intellectuals and scientific experts.   
73 Cf. Offe, Claus (1990), ‘Reflections on the Institutional Self-transformation of Movement Politics: A 
Tentative Stage Model’, in Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (eds.), Challenging the Political Order: 
New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (Cambridge: Polity). 
74 Hofstadter, Idea of a Party System. 
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democracy.  Following this line of thought, might one not regard it as definitional of the party, 
at least as a political ideal, that it is a group that ‘plays by the rules’?75 
While the concerns that suggest such a move are well grounded, one must resist 
evoking partisanship in this domesticated fashion.  It is not just that, empirically, solid 
agreement on the so-called constitutional essentials is rarely manifest in party politics, that 
procedures are invariably politicised.  More to the point is that playing by the rules is 
ultimately a situational virtue, dependent on the existence of structures that are relatively fair 
and stable over time.  The concept of party cannot be limited to such situations: on the 
contrary, their absence may be one of its inspirations.  Honouring the partisan claim to be 
acting on behalf of generalisable principles and aims will occasionally require departing from 
institutional arrangements as they are.76  Protecting party-political pluralism itself will 
sometimes be one of the ends appropriately served by contesting existing structures.77  The 
concept of partisanship must retain space for the extraordinary and the disruptive – for the 
logic of revolutionary action, and for action aimed at creating new institutions.  What properly 
tempers partisanship is not the willingness to accept existing procedures, but the acceptance 
of the contestable character of the partisan claim, which any new institutional settlement 
should reflect.78  It is this ethos, rather than a certain relation to existing institutions, that we 
wish to underline.  The obvious risks that attend the politicisation of procedures are not 
sufficient to make consent to them a defining characteristic of partisanship.   
 
 
Who is a Partisan? 
 
Notwithstanding the important distinctions between party, interest group and social 
movement, it follows from our description that one can be a partisan even if one is not 
formally a member of a party organisation.  At the core of the efforts of partisans is an 
organisation within which partisan practices find a peculiarly dense and coordinated form.  
Yet, as we have emphasised, partisanship as a practice need not always follow closely the 
contours of party membership: it may extend beyond the face-to-face contacts of membership 
to a broader network of political activists seeking to advance largely the same goals, even in 
the absence of formal attachments.79  Partisanship, we suggest, is more than what party 
members do.   
There are several reasons why it is important to understand partisanship in this larger 
sense.  One is because the wider circle of partisans who lack formal ties to the group may still 
contribute much to its cause.   This is most obviously true at the very beginning of its life: a 																																																								
75 The possibility is suggested in Muirhead and Rosenblum’s discussion of Rawls and the idea of ‘quasi-great 
parties’ (Muirhead, Russell and Nancy Rosenblum (2006), ‘Political Liberalism vs. “The Great Game of 
Politics”: The Politics of Political Liberalism’, Perspectives on Politics 4 (1), pp.101-2); cf. Rosenblum, On 
the Side of Angels, chaps. 8 and 9. 
76 On some of the unexpected possibilities inherent in the concept of ‘loyal opposition’, see Waldron, Jeremy 
(2011), ‘The Principle of Loyal Opposition’, NYU Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 12-
22. 
77 Consider in this regard efforts in the UK to reform or abolish the House of Lords: amongst their rationales is 
the aim to make government more responsive to the public and to revitalise Westminster as a site of 
meaningful partisan debate. 
78 I.e. while the contestation of institutional procedures may sometimes be appropriate, the aim to produce new 
institutions insensitive to political contestation (e.g. authoritarian ones) is not.  We return to this point in the 
discussion of transnational partisanship. 
79 See White, Jonathan and Lea Ypi (2011), ‘On Partisan Political Justification’, American Political Science 
Review 105 (2), pp.381-396; also Scarrow, Beyond Party Members.  This less structured constellation 
resembles what von Mohl described as a ‘grouping’, i.e. a politically-focused collection of individuals that 
‘lacks defined organisation or boundaries’ (von Mohl, ‘Die Parteien im Staate’).   
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party can only be founded by those who are not yet formally associated with one another and 
whose ties consist only in their commonality of purpose.  Partisanship prefigures the party.  
The importance of non-members holds true also over the course of a party’s development.  
Those thereby aligned with the partisan association are an important source of members-to-
be.  Not only may these sympathisers replenish the party at critical moments with those 
committed to its principles and aims, but the prospect of their joining in future gives members 
reason to maintain the party’s ideational focus.  As scholars of social movements have come 
to emphasise, these liminal relations between party members and partisan sympathisers are 
highly significant for preserving the political identity of both.80 
Those beyond a party who consistently align with it may also help mediate between 
the party and the wider society.  They influence the extent to which its projects are heard and 
sympathetically received.  Indeed, the strength of their contribution may derive precisely from 
the fact they are not formally associated with the party.  For much of the modern period, 
media organisations have had informal ties with parties whose cause they have helped 
advance exactly by being organisationally independent of them, and thus able to claim 
impartiality for their opinions.  In the present period, a similar status is cultivated by think-
tanks, blogs and other online forums.81  Especially in an age of scepticism towards parties, 
these non-member partisans may carry a level of public authority that significantly augments 
a party’s prospects of success and capacity to justify its cause.82  Their interventions help 
shape the commonsense ideas that determine how far a party’s proposals are socially 
resonant.83      
The benefits and sacrifices associated with partisanship do not, in other words, map 
neatly onto the membership group.  Individuals and groups may be the locus of partisanship, 
even without formal links to the party organisation.84  This raises the possibility of relations 
of obligation between partisan members and non-members.  By virtue of their shared 
commitments and coordinated efforts to advance them, partisans may be said to develop 
ethical ties, additional to whatever ties are associated with their background identity as 
citizens, nationals, and so forth.  The party, one may say, is an ethical unity before it is an 
organisational one – though the two interrelate – and it is by appeal to such obligations that 
partisans may hope to remedy some of the empirical problems that come with organisation 
and the distribution of roles.85  Ethical ties across the membership boundary also raise 
questions concerning partisanship’s norms of publicity – the extent to which, for example, 
members and non-members have an obligation to the wider political community to declare 
their mutual allegiances.  An adequate conception of partisanship must recognise, in other 
words, the full force, ethical and power-political, of the ties that link party members and their 																																																								
80 See McAdam and Tarrow, ‘Ballots and Barricades’. 
81 On the relation between party organisations and think-tanks, see Pautz, Hartwig (2012) Think-Tanks, Social 
Democracy and Social Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); on partisanship and blogs, see Farrell, 
Henry, Eric Lawrence and John Sides (2010), ‘Self-Segregation or Deliberation? Blog Readership, 
Participation, and Polarization in American Politics’, Perspectives on Politics 8 (1), pp.141-57. 
82 On the importance of conservative media outlets in the US for the success of the Tea Party, see Skocpol, 
Theda and Vanessa Williamson (2013), The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism 
(Oxford: OUP).  
83 On the use of a television persona to achieve this effect, see the reflections of the leader of Podemos 
(Iglesias, Pablo (2015), ‘Understanding Podemos’, New Left Review 93 (May / June)). 
84 The converse is also true: party membership is not sufficient to make a partisan.  Members who cease to 
promote generalizable principles and aims, who are largely passive, or who act persistently at odds with the 
commitments of their party, fail to meet the description of a partisan. 
85 Cf. White, Jonathan (forthcoming), ‘The Party in Time’, British Journal of Political Science; also Chaps. 5 
and 6 below.  On the challenges of organization: Michels, Robert (1959 / 1915), Political Parties: A 
Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Dover); Panebianco, 
Angelo (1988) Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: CUP). 
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sympathisers in view of their shared commitments.  An exclusive focus on that part of the 
partisan association that is organised and legally recognised will miss much of what is 
politically consequential. 
To insist on the significance of non-member partisans is not to suggest organisation 
and membership are inessential components of partisanship.  A party, in contrast to a 
movement, is not well seen as a spontaneous order.  The acts of coordination that produce it 
predictably require regulation by decision-making rules, coupled with boundaries to 
demarcate who is included and excluded.  Although empirical researchers correctly identify 
the increasingly fuzzy and permeable boundaries of many contemporary political groups, and 
the rise of intermediary and less demanding forms of affiliation,86 a normative conception of 
the party cannot embrace such tendencies indiscriminately.  Ease of affiliation can dilute the 
commitments around which the party claims to unite, as well as the investment expected of 
members.  Likewise, a party lacking regularised procedures is likely to be one more easily 
dominated by the few (this being one reason why parties in some jurisdictions are legally 
required to have a constitution).  Partisan associative practices cannot be decoupled from the 
party as member-based organisation. 
The point is rather that the two must be seen in conjunction.  Partisanship needs an 
organised party at the centre of it, to give it shape, continuity and executive capacity, but at 
the same time the organisation draws strength from those who are more loosely aligned, yet 
who are considerably more engaged than mere ‘supporters’.  Just as activists need the 
enduring organisation of the party to be successful, members benefit from the non-
membership of others allied to their cause, and each may develop obligations to the other.  At 
the transnational level especially, as well as in extraordinary political moments, we may be 
interested in the interactions of those who do not share party membership, yet whose 
cooperation seems qualitatively different from a pact of expedience.  Rather than question the 
value of membership and organisation, the point of an enlarged perspective is to appreciate 
the potency and indispensability of what non-members do, and how a party prospers when 
thus embedded in a more loosely structured community of partisans. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As this chapter has sought to show, something important is lost if the concept of party is 
approached in purely empirical fashion.  Rather than build one’s understanding solely by 
observing the kinds of political group that contest elections, one should approach it – as so 
many political concepts are approached – as a point of intersection between realworld 
practices and normative ideals.  Concretely, this means renewing an emphasis on what is 
arguably the distinctive partisan stance: the claim to endorse principles and aims that are 
irreducible to the interest of a sectoral grouping, that are to be pursued in coordination with 
like-minded peers, and that depend on persuasion of others if they are to be successfully 
advanced.   
One reason it matters to approach partisanship in this way is so that the failings of 
political groups as we encounter them are properly assessed.  A conception of party that is 
normatively undemanding will lead either to an uncritical attitude towards parties as they 
exist, or to an unnuanced critique that tars some by association with others.  In contemporary 
scholarship the latter especially is visible in the work of deliberative theorists who, certainly 
until recently, have tended to dismiss parties as the intrusion of private interest on public 																																																								
86 Cf. Scarrow, Beyond Party Members, p.3, on ‘multi-speed membership parties’; cf. Gauja, Anika (2015), 
‘The Construction of Party Membership’, European Journal of Political Research 54 (2), pp.232–48.   
 25 
reason. Where no distinction is made between party and interest group, the former will tend 
to be dismissed for the failings of the latter.  Only if one reaffirms the distinctiveness of the 
partisan claim, even in circumstances where perhaps just a minority of existing political 
groups credibly advance it, will one have a feel for why parties were ever thought crucial to 
democracy. 
There are also good empirical grounds for wanting a normatively demanding 
conception of party.  It helps sensitise one to some of the less obvious reasons for which 
individuals may choose to associate with a party – reasons connected to the epistemic value 
of shared political commitments, and the motivational appeal of contributing to a long-lasting 
political project alongside a community of the like-minded.87  It draws attention to the kinds 
of obligation that partisans may be said to incur, how they negotiate them, and the practical 
challenges they face in fulfilling them.  It also puts focus on how choices concerning the 
structure of a party may give rise to particular kinds of grievance or disaffection.  A 
normatively-aware conception of partisanship opens up further lines of empirical research in 
other words, and therefore holds relevance for the political science in this area.       
The chapters that follow seek to flesh out further the points we have sketched.  We 
look more closely at the ideas, orientations, obligations and practices constitutive of 
partisanship properly understood, and how these intersect with some core features of 
democratic life.  Such an account should highlight in distinctive fashion why democracy 
needs its partisans, as well as put in relief some of the key trends of contemporary politics. 
 
																																																								
87 See chapters 4 and 6.  
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